On Trees and Beasts, or How Ideas of Nature Shape Our Spaces

“Excerpts from a project on Trees and Beasts”
Denise Hoffman Brandt
© Denise Hoffman
What do we actually mean when we talk about nature? As a professor in a discipline that since the early 1970s has, mostly, claimed to practice “design with nature”—referencing Ian McHarg’s book (1969) of that title—that’s a question I have often asked. With thirty-eight editions in multiple languages his book remains one of the best-selling ever written by a designer, and its title has become an equalizing mantra among landscape architects designing everything from golf courses to eco-parks. McHarg’s mission was to rebut anthropocentric ideas embedded in the Judeo-Christian tradition that promoted a rapacious attitude toward earth systems. But he did not reject all anthropocentric Christian ideology; his idea of nature was ordered by the belief that humans’ exceptional capacity to reason made them responsible for the earth. And while that idea of nature can be traced back to Aristotle, whose scala naturae—a universal and absolute hierarchy of all matter from the lowest rocks and worms to humans at the top—it was pulled forward into Christianity by Thomas Aquinas with his Great Chain of Being.
Design with Nature was, admirably, positioned as not designing only for humans; but it was premised on the idea that humans are suited to determine the design of everything. How things would be designed came down to their morality—again, very Christian. To McHarg, a good human was one who worked to sustain existing environmental systems on behalf of other organisms. But not just to be generous, he promoted city-nature dualism by arguing that the not-urban/suburban realm had an “ennobling” value. Humans were made better by the stuff he called nature so it should be preserved. Setting aside his faulty assumption that humans can master dynamic earth systems, I want to point out some of the flaws of that line of thinking in practice.
Stewards belong on cruise ships where they can nurture guests and clean up as per the captain’s orders. Calling ourselves stewards of the earth, we illegitimately situate every other living thing as guests that we are, fundamentally, in charge of. The only difference between a steward who wants to extract wealth from a guest and one who wants to make them comfortable is the inclination of the steward’s moral judgment—or that of the captain, whatever authority is up the political ladder. We have ample evidence of the dicey results of allowing those in power to determine exactly what constitutes ethical behavior. In this case, even the structure of the argument is too loose—allowing for gross slippage. Environmentalists who call on humans to save the earth because they can, do so with the same argument that extractionists use to claim humans deserve to reap earthly bounty. This has proved disastrous: with both sides making the same moral argument in support of different ambitions, human-adaptation to environmental change has been mired in intractable moral arguments.
To get past the impasse, we need to bypass the rationale that humans are fit to arbitrate the earth and define ourselves not as over, but with the rest of our earthly cohort. To illustrate my point, I will return to McHarg: even when a moral environmental ambition is achieved, success is chancy. Human reason is just not all it’s cracked up to be. On projects around greater Baltimore starting in the 1950’s, the office of Wallace and McHarg used “suitability analysis,” a quasi-scientific method of overlaying maps of local or regionally specific environmental conditions to assess opportunities and constraints for different types of land-use. Because the mandate for development was itself never in question, the method was a mechanism to determine what must be city, versus what should be nature. As with many data-driven devices, McHarg’s framing of the problem predicted his solution: some places were better than others.
Referring to himself as the “green-fingered planner” responsible for environmental conservation, McHarg called his partner, David Wallace, making proposals for infrastructures, economic development, and legislative policy, the “brown-fingered planner.” In Design with Nature’s chapter on “A Response to Values” McHarg described his “Plan for the Valleys” commissioned by “a voluntary non-profit citizen group,” of estate-owners. Their former farmland had commodified scenic value that represented their social status. McHarg celebrated the group for preventing a “wallpaper of development [from being] unrolled on the landscape.” As if the choice was either/or. It was not.
David Wallace, wrote later in his book, Urban Planning/My Way (2004) that the larger plan had advocated for
“relatively high densities and … [a] cross-section of ethnic and income groups”
achievable with careful planning of circulation infrastructure and zoning code. And he pointed out that the landscape plan had armed the community with arguments against expanding circulation and septic infrastructure that served what he called: an
“elitist conspiracy among the rich white landowners and the government they controlled to provide de facto segregation.”
The Villagers chose to honor McHarg’s idea of nature because it was a means to their end: sustaining the status quo of their status. That environmental neoliberalism persists in the dreams of Silicon Valley elites buying up California farmland to build themselves “utopian” enclaves and landscape architect-led ecological restoration megaprojects funded by consortia promoting economic development as the answer to environmental devastation. They too use the same dicey logic: they assert that technology-derived tactics for doing good for the environment must, perforce, be correct and morally just. Even wilderness has become embroiled in corporate genetic technologies offering a pretense of recovery for lost species in lieu of living with what we have got. We do not need to rewild other species: we need to rescale ourselves. Landscape architects’ complaisance with such scenarios is at the root of their loss-of-voice in environmental discourses.
Nature is not really the stuff outside; it is in our heads, and our ideas of nature change over time. If we want to change our environmental future, we will have to change our minds first, and we could start by rethinking human exceptionalism. A little over a year ago I stood atop a scarp formed by one of the four extinct volcanoes making up Isla San Cristóbal overlooking the bay where the Beagle had landed in 1835—with Charles Darwin (1809-1882) on it. That’s a punny but apt metaphor. Darwin’s theory of natural selection was like the moonwalk: humanity’s understanding of its place in earth’s systems—an idea of nature—has never been the same since. His argument was grounded in Galapagos finches, whose beak-form variations were distinctive to each remote island, indicating that populations had evolved adaptive traits based on food-type availability. He recognized that fat, tough beaks cracked seeds, skinny, pointy beaks snaffled beetles out of tree bark or sucked in nectar. Darwin could not pin down the exact mechanism of natural selection, but he understood that living organisms adapt, and that random variability within a species influences population-change over time through evolution.
- We often imagine that places remain unchanged over time if they have not been meddled with by humans. Charles Darwin was on the HMS Beagle when it moored in this Galapagos cove. I have no idea if this is what he really experienced: everything changes, everywhere, all at once. (photo: Denise Hoffman Brandt)
Darwin’s ideas were reinterpreted—as in hijacked—right from the start by a lot of go-betweens claiming to defend them. Herbert Spencer’s (1820-1903) combination of his own ambitions for human progress with the theory of natural selection became a dominant social idea of nature. Spencer, who came up with the term “survival of the fittest,” rationalized it as a path toward betterment by way of unregulated social and economic competition. Darwin only reluctantly adopted the term in a late edition of Origin. Natural selection was a random process; reducing it to an individual and social existential battle for dominance was contradictory to his intent. Having stirred up the zeitgeist with On the Origin of Species (1859), Darwin must have felt he had some further explaining to do. Twelve years later in The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871), he suggested that mental traits could be passed on to offspring and thus were at play within natural selection. It was an idea that would bite him and the rest of us in the backside after others—including a cousin of his—developed the theory of eugenics from it.
Darwin’s theories were reshaped into a rationale sustaining the political status quo. Thomas Henry Huxley—often called Darwin’s bulldog for his supposed defense of him—provided the first graphical representation of human progress as a species in Evidence as to Man’s Place in Nature (1863). Its frontispiece depicted skeletons in profile, as if walking from left to right. Against a blank background the species unfold, increasing in stature, to make clear that those bodies behind us were not as noble as the ones we have now. But that was never Darwin’s intent: to reiterate, his 1871 book was titled Descent of Man. In that same volume he affirmed his idea that biological inclusivity is natural: “there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties.”
- Frontispiece to Huxley’s ”Evidence as to Man’s Place in Nature” (1863). Drawn by Benjamin Waterhouse Hawkins.
It was an affirmation that all hominids are made of the same stuff and therefore have the same core potential. And to hedge against those who would revive ridicule that he lowered humans to the level of apes he added “…the difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind.” He was threading a conceptual needle, but he affirmed no difference among humans in the context of contemporary theorists, like Louise Agassiz of Harvard University, who denied that evolution was real but argued that human types identified as races were actually different species with distinct, inherent intellectual and physical abilities. Darwin was not exempt from biases common in his place and time, but we often forget that natural selection was an explanation for diversity that affirmed its benefits.
Another illustration of human evolutionary ascent was drawn four years before McHarg’s book—maybe as a subtle encouragement not to end the lineage with nuclear testing. Titled “The Road to Homo Sapiens,” and also known as “The March of Progress,” in the Early Man volume of the Life Nature Library, the graphic revealed recently discovered primate and hominid species dating back 22 million years. It’s another parade of human relatives, but to reinforce that we had fleshed out our understanding of our forebears, the bodies were fleshed-out too. As in Huxley’s version, development progressed from heavily slumped primate to muscular, erect hominid, but mental stature was newly implied with reference to tool-use: early-predecessors carried rocks, and the penultimate figure holds a spear. The final figure’s lack of a weapon might have indicated humanity’s new-found moral elevation, but the sunset-tinted background reminded me of Agent Orange—a devastating weapon being deployed by the US at that time in the Vietnam War to not just burn humans alive but to make sure those that survived had no home or food to return to. So much for stewardship.
By emphasizing a lineage and not a family tree, representations of the “Ascent of Man” assimilated Darwin’s theory into the same old, same old hierarchy with humans at the top. But instead of affirmation by a metaphysical God, our position was now substantiated by science. Evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould once called the image a “straitjacket of linear advance” that should more accurately be described as “a copiously branching bush, continually pruned by the grim reaper of extinction.” But Gould stopped short of calling out the hypocrisy of lauding an abstract continuum of human progress as a species while denying social equity among humans. And that might have had something to do with Gould’s recapitulation of the same-old, same-old belief that nature is nasty and brutal that had for centuries been used to validate inequitable policies as naturally competitive.
In Animals and Why They Matter (1998) Mary Midgley articulated the issue:
“There exists, I believe, an impression that … cut-throat competition between species is the law of evolution. This is false and the reading of such pop-gun fantasies into evolutionary theory is a serious error. … People supposed that all they had to do to increase resources was to destroy their competitors – insect pests, rodents and others – and walk away with the proceeds. Had competition really been the basic law of life, they ought to have been right. But they weren’t. Things have therefore gone badly wrong.”
Positivist materialist philosophers such as Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett popularized the idea that at the first sign of any scarcity, all living things are—like Malthusian robots—genetically programmed to compete with each other for what is left. They leveraged Darwin’s theory to normalize behaviors that Dawkins himself has referred to as “selfish,” justifying them as natural law. But that perspective not only overlooks all the cooperative behaviors normative among beasts of all kinds—including humans—it obscures the value of emotional agency in favor of elevating technological capacities for domination using weapons like Agent Orange. The tragedy is that Darwin’s idea was “dangerous” (Dennett’s claim) not because it suggested there was nothing special about living organisms—that living things will just do their selfish thing. It was dangerous because he affirmed there was something special about all types of beings; and a lot people—those comfortable at the top of political hierarchies—don’t want to live in that kind of nature.
There are other ways to think. And I am going to conclude by making a case for why we should reconsider envisioning ourselves as stewards designing for dependents and instead start to seek terms of parity. But to do that I have to clarify a point about how we think of our own capacity to reason. Early 17th century philosopher, Rene Descartes, put his spin on human exceptionalism with the idea of the beast-machine: nonhuman bodies are animated by machine-like processes, whereas humans’ bodies are like machines, but their minds enable them to be conscious of reality and that makes them exceptional. Collaterally, his theory created the mind-body problem, a dualism debated for centuries—usually with arguments that attempt to resolve it. Dawkins and Dennett’s materialist rationale ala Darwin was one of those efforts. Their theories resolved it by eliminating the human mind as the means by which we know reality. To a strict materialist, thoughts are the electrochemical products of human brains—without human-like neurological systems, other beasts have none.
- Descartes-Lhomme-1637 Diagram from René Descartes’ “L’Homme,” a treatise on man. Mathematician and metaphysician René Descartes (1596–1650), theorizing about first principles such as being (ontology) and knowing (epistemology), reshuffled the field of life into two divisions: material things with rational minds (res cogitans) and things of only matter (res extensa). Humans were situated in the former and every other living thing in the latter.
In “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” philosopher Thomas Nagel (1974) disputed such theories with his title question. Asserting that “I assume we believe that all bats have experience,” he called attention to common acceptance that non-human vertebrates have capacity to sense themselves in their context, to know reality through subjective experience. His point was that “to form a conception of what it is like to be a bat … one must take up the bat’s point of view.” Citing bat’s sensing with sonar—an incomprehensible-to-humans mind-body sensation—he argued that we should take up the “challenge to form new concepts and devise a new method – an objective phenomenology not dependent on empathy or the imagination.” In other words, we cannot know what it is like to be a bat based on how we know ourselves—we cannot see them through the lenses we use to construct our idea of the world—of nature. But we can look for ways to know their ideas of nature.
I do not think it is coincidence that Nagel was writing after a lot of psychologists—aware of Jane Goodall’s findings at Gombe—revived the practice of testing primate-capacities to learn language by adopting infant-chimps into their homes and treating them like human children. William Furness, after adopting primates and moving their mouths to try to get them to talk in 1916, despaired of primate-consciousness. The mid-twentieth century psychologist and eugenicist Robert Yerkes took up raising chimps and founded the Yale University Laboratories of Primate Biology, to prove his belief that “the great apes have plenty to talk about.” Once he realized chimp-anatomy prevented them from talking like humans, he suggested American sign language (ASL). In 1967, psychologist R. Allen Gardner and ethologist Beatrix Gardner published their findings for “Project Washoe” indicating that the female chimp was, to a degree, effectively conversational. She could exchange words with her human social group and could string more than one word together to convey more explicit meaning.
The Gardners’ stated objective was “to learn how much chimps are like humans,” although they did make some effort to recreate a chimp-like tight social cohort for her by hiring a lot of graduate students to care for her and teach her ASL. When they wanted to replicate their findings with other chimps, Washoe was sent to the Institute for Primate Studies at the University of Oklahoma along with one PhD candidate, Roger Fouts, who was finishing his dissertation. She was lucky to have the continuity; other chimp-research subjects went from yards and caretakers to cages. In the context of sending chimps into space to test conditions for humans and infecting them with diseases before injecting them with trial vaccines, treating primates like kids—juvenile humans—doesn’t sound so bad. But all of those endeavors were backed by the same flawed idea of nature: being human was the only way of being that mattered.
Proof-of-human-ness was proof of value. Given that many people (including me) struggle to learn another human language, the chimps’ having learned a language on the other side of the species-barrier is extremely impressive. But what is more impressive is that in order to do that, the chimps had to rebuild their whole understanding of reality: what it is to be like a chimp. We generally fail to recognize that how we understand them is always in terms of how we understand us and the earth as we experience it. Assuming our consciousness of what is real, and how we know it, applies to every being, we design every other thing’s world to our specifications—even when we are trying to act on their behalf.
In The Moral Lives of Animals (2011) Dale Peterson recounted two tales of lying chimps raised in human families and treated like human children; one of them was Washoe. By two-years-old—still in the Gardner’s yard in Reno—she could “brush her teeth, linger over and comment on the pictures in a book or magazine, use a toilet, sew random stitches with needle and thread, loosen screws with a screwdriver” and more. She could also be duplicitous. Feigning interest in a location distant enough from a hotly desired can of soda, Washoe duped Fouts into checking to see what she was looking at. She then raced to claim her prize and escaped to drink it. Fouts, was astonished by “a level of planning and deception beyond anything I thought her capable of.” His expectations were surpassed by Washoe’s human-style planning intelligence: she conceived of an indirect means to an end.
He was equally taken aback by her “deception.” Morality is a social code of behavior, and deceit is never morally neutral in human society. Washoe’s transgression fell into a couple of stereotypical beastly types. Did Fouts imagine Washoe to be a noble savage above the petty immorality of a soda-scam? I doubt it. He seemed amazed that she acted-on her animal nature to impulsively, intelligently, and courageously, albeit immorally by human standards, fulfill her desire. But who is to say what is moral or immoral in a chimp’s understanding of reality—especially a chimp struggling to assimilate into the behavioral regime of another species?
In Peterson’s second account, Fouts’ was working with another young female chimp in Oklahoma, “Lucy.” She had an impressive vocabulary in sign language and an occasional incapacity to get to the toilet on time. When Fouts confronted her with evidence of a lapse on the carpet, Lucy sinned by omission: she pretended not to know what he was talking about. When he persisted, she named others as the culprit. Lucy finally admitted what Fouts saw as the truth: “LUCY DIRTY DIRTY. SORRY LUCY.” But among Lucy’s species, going to the bathroom on the ground and not in a toilet is not a behavioral aberration. For the ape to identify the “accident” as “DIRTY” signified that she had been coerced into at least acknowledging, if not actually feeling, the moral emotion of disgust, followed by another moral emotion, remorse. Lucy felt “SORRY.”
Peterson questioned whether Lucy regretted the transgressive act or the deception and offered: “We often use deceit to cover some other moral failure, but one distinctive thing about human lying is that we understand that the lie itself is wrong.” That rose-colored view of humanity overlooked the dodginess of human behaviors and the ambivalence of human moral judgment. Lying is common and often accompanied by defensive righteousness. And judgements of the kind and degree of falsehood are far from universal in practice. Washoe’s deception was mild: more along the lines of entrapment—she only implied that there was something worth checking out, she never stated it. Emmanuel Kant was notable for arguing that coercion was morally worse than lying. And while that has long been debated, it is safe to say that both are of a kind in terms of being unethical. Humans enact coercive control on each other all the time—threats, bribes, flattery etc.—with varying degrees of criminality. And we often use it on animals without thinking twice. I will coax my cat from under the bed with a treat so I can plunge him into his cat-carrier for a trip. It is a short-term coercive offence. But living in a human family in accord with their moral code distorted Washoe’s and Lucy’s lives into a product of coercion.
Despite some recognition of their conscious awareness, both chimps suffered immersion in alien landscapes that demanded alien behavioral patterns, altering their conscious-being. Lucy’s and Washoe’s caretakers convinced them that altering their beings to become like humans was the way they had to be. And it was a profound coercion, a far more substantive degree of dishonesty than Washoe’s taking advantage of her caretakers’ gullibility and failure to secure the soda, or Lucy’s lies to avoid humiliation or punishment. That flawed approach is best understood in light of Allan Gardner’s statement to Roger Fouts before he hired him: “Science doesn’t need philosophy, … If you are influenced by them it will show that you weren’t worth anything to begin with.” (From the Friends of Washoe website.) Nagel’s suggestion that we recognize others’ subjective conscious experiences as real stands in stark contrast to the premise that Washoe and Lucy could be close-to-human—as if that would make them somehow better.
Our admiration for how marvelously human-like some nonhumans are—from dogs that collaborate with us in games or hunting, to apes that can make paintings—is a commendation of their high capacity for assimilation. Respect is given in exchange for an animal giving up its other ways to be in order to be like us; or at the very least to be like a pet, fitting its ways into our ways. Those that don’t fit are, like enemy-competitors, destroyed or evicted from our realm. If we look hard at how we design our world, even when we imagine we are designing with nature, it is not really that much different from the toy-strewn chimp-play areas in those psychologists’ backyards; or worse, the cages and glassed-in rooms of primate research centers. We design for us, and any attempt to design with the rest of our earthly cohort is on our terms.
Perhaps mindful of Nagel’s idea, psychologists and primatologists have changed their ways: most research undertaken into the evolution of language today is carried out in the species’ habitat—constricted as it may be by expanded urbanization—and the objective is to work towards understanding nonhuman communications and lifeways. Landscape architects would be well-served by doing something similar. At some point we will have to admit that nature, as we know it, is a bunch of bad ideas perpetuated to sustain the status quo at the expense of communities both human and nonhuman that are made subjects of the dominant—as in policy-making—social group.
Disciplinary pedagogy is generally light on philosophy but still burdened with neoliberal morality. That will have to change if new ideas of nature are to be gleaned from the diversity of living things. Landscape architects would benefit from taking up Nagel’s challenge. They could start by framing conceptual tools that are ontological, that respect a fundamental collaborative status of being as opposed to just taking charge, either as stewards or by setting all living things against each other in some false survivalist narrative. Likewise, epistemological approaches must be developed that encompass the diversity of all earthly umwelts—all ideas of nature—within design thinking.
*Denise Hoffman Brandt earned her educational credentials at the University of Pennsylvania in art history, continuing painting at Pratt Institute and concluding with studying landscape architecture at the University of Pennsylvania. Prior to holding a professorship at the City College of New York, she was an adjunct and visiting professor at Columbia University and Pratt Institute. She was also a project manager at Michael Van Valkenburgh Associates and a senior landscape architect at Mathews Nielsen Landscape Architects, before establishing her own practice Hoffman Brandt Projects, where among other topics, she engages in activist design for crisis situations and critical mapping, say uranium activities across the US or gun cartridge distribution found after the 2015 Baltimore protests.
Denise is currently working on a book, on Trees and Beasts, excerpts from which are presented above. You can also find out more in the Landezine conversation, available here.
Published on July 2, 2024
This was really interesting, I would like to hear her thoughts on how to approach urban and suburban design with this mindset. She comments on our ‘loss of voice’ and how even large wilderness projects have been commoditized, so I wonder, what are some solutions? Too bad her book is not out yet!
Thank you for your interest, Alaira. I’m glad that you picked up that I am calling for a transformation of a “mindset”; here are a few more thoughts from the book-in-progress in response to your question. My background is in the design of densely urbanized territories, so I habitually think in terms of what you refer to as “urban and suburban design.” And yet I have come to realize that the balkanization of land into urban, suburban, rural, and wilderness—a Euro-American construct that accords with and promotes the perpetuation of ideas that humans are somehow distinct from the rest of nature—undermines design practice. That mindset situates humans at the opposite end of the gradient of what is wilderness, by definition a territory defined by its lack of humanity. When we make those distinctions within human ecosystems, we unwittingly spatialize a hierarchy of being.
For most of recorded history, distinguishing between city, country—agricultural lands—and wilderness simply promoted humans as, literally, the masters of all they surveyed. “City” signals civilization versus backwardness. That determination was unfortunately applied to people as well as places; there are countless derogatory terms for rural denizens, and societies living still more remote from global cities are often deemed primitive. Conversely, lands with less-visible human impacts are idealized in eras of environmental awareness—periods when humans perceive themselves as woven into Earth-ecosystem dynamics and having a detrimental effect on them that should be rectified. In the current era of environmentalism triggered by concerns about pollution, nuclear threats, and climate change, those two ways of seeing nature coexist in contemporary Euro-American societies. Designers and planners have, mostly, situated themselves in a kind of economically-viable middle ground. I referred to planners who chose not to discuss climate change with their clients along the southern Atlantic coastline and instead just tried to slip into their projects doing the right thing when they had the opportunity. That attitude sustains the conceptual stasis that plays out more widely as an operational standstill when it comes to mitigating climate change and other challenges.
To change our environmental actions, we need to change our language. I am not suggesting that designers and planners choose to starve, rather that effort be made to realign the overall perception of nature away from hierarchies of being and toward an understanding that we exist in a continuum of being. Practitioners could consistently make the point that human territories are no better—or worse—than nonhuman territories by reaffirming our codependences. One example of that was the Baltimore Ecosystem Study. That team worked to increase human-nonhuman community wellbeing by making more robust connections between residents and their ecosystem, but not as passive enjoyers of it, instead by helping them position themselves as collaborators within it. In other words, they understood the city as natural.
I will use that project as an example of what I suspect will be necessary for any wholesale transformation of how we think and act within the Earth’s physical phenomena and forces: serial questioning. Steward T. A. Pickett, director of the Baltimore Ecosystem Study (funded by NSF with support from the Forest Service) started out in 1998 by tracing vegetation’s systemic variabilities in urban environments in relation to structure, function, and people. He quickly realized the team needed a geographer to map social phenomena, and as the project evolved the increasingly multi-disciplinary team engaged directly with members of the community, environmental institutions, and government agencies not to offer solutions, but to understand and document how they perceived their world.
Over decades, the project has generated a cascade of scientific reports exploring myriad questions in an effort to enhance relationships across all components of the local urban-ecosystem, opening many scientists’ eyes to the importance of recognizing human mediated systems as also-ecological. But as a solitary project representative of complex concepts that ran counter to common expectations, it did not overcome the entrenched bias within the larger community of ecologists, much less the larger population. The idea that cities are not ecosystems—they are not nature—remains dominant.
Pickett asked questions, and when he brought in people to answer them, they in turn asked more questions. There was no singular solution. We know we live in a world of contingencies, and instead of promoting the value of questions, designers have fallen into the trap of feeling that it is their job to provide answers. The pretense of control is unsustainable: as uncertainties spiral designers become more imperiled. Clients have sued designers for non-fulfillment of contracts because the built project did not look like the renderings—as if the entire project’s worth was tied to an explicit visual outcome. Looping clients into complex questions—including research as a key phase of projects—rather than projecting expertise as authority would improve our built world and expedite the transformation of ideas of nature.
Denise,
I’m afraid my response is rather plainly worded but heartfelt. Love your work and agree with your disection the preconcpetual premises set up by McHarg et al.
Physically, a lot of the segmentation of land use between ‘pure urban’ and ‘natural’ seems in my limited experience, to also be one of practical ease by those not involved in the aesthetic or philosophical side of design, but the engineers as allowed by zoning laws, adopted into use by the politicians. Yes, some of the differentiation is influenced in the background by ecologically / aesthetically-minded people like us, but ultimately driven by brute expediency of benching housing lots and drainage etc.
I can shout until the cows come home about the cleared native trees I am forced to ignore because the client developing the site has paid for the LVIA and I cannot take a stand, despite my moral and ethical objections.
“They HAVE to go because…. reasons (civils)… and the site is zoned for housing.”
REALLY…!?!?!?
Breaks open massive discussions on population and economocs driven by growth as only solution.
AM AN ARDENT ADMIRER TO YOUR WORKS.LOTS OF INFORMATION AND THOUGHTFUL IDEAS.I EVEN WOULD HAVE LOVED IF WE COULD WORK ON DIFFERENT ISSUES WHICH ALSO TOUCHES ON PSYCHO ANALYSIS ON S PECIFIC FIELDS IN LIFE.OTHERWISE KEEP IT UP.
Response to Daryl Smith
Daryl, I think your question nails the frustration landscape architects feel when their priorities—derived from skills and understandings of cultural values and physical ecosystems generally understood to be part of their disciplinary-wheelhouse—carry little weight in project decision-making guided by the best practices of other disciplines. I’ve been there and wanting to “shout until the cows come home” is a polite way to describe the disheartening feelings of not being heard and anticipating environmental or social loss. As you say, some of the impetus for over-simplification of ecosystemic issues is rooted in “practical ease.” It is indeed less onerous to act when you have conceptually reduced complex socioenvironmental systems to simple problems solvable with rote procedures dictated by unfortunate necessities—like clear-cutting a stand of trees that have cultural significance and habitat-value in order to prepare ground for necessary development.
The scenario you describe is common, despite also-common awareness that such an approach frequently fails miserably on many fronts. Diminishment of biota, reinforcement of perceived barriers between humans and Earth systems, and, more often than not, underperformance in whatever general-yet grandiose mission to improve peoples’ lives the project promoted. Given that, I inferred that persistence is rooted in the structures of professional practice that establish a hierarchy of reason. Landscape architects are expected to defend their rationales for doing the right things with the same positivist criteria used by engineers and developers. Intractable conflicts are inevitable when two, legitimated-as-rational and therefore presumably right-thinking, positions are in direct opposition. In response to your comment, I will attempt to break down the way professional practice directs the structure of those arguments you find so maddening, and then end with a thought for change.
I see two key commonalities between all the players in your scenario. First, all parties take the position that they have the capacity to reasonably determine and affect a good outcome when designing, planning, and building in places deemed to have nature—meaning sites where nonhuman life-systems are legible. Second, all parties must ground their positions in professional credentials structured to affirm a measured, true assessment of reality. Academic degrees and licensing exam scores quantify competence, attendance in a required number of continuing education classes verifies the maintenance of competence, levels of artistry are assumed to be affirmed by commercial market-based financial status. I discussed the underpinnings of the first commonality in the interview and essay, so I will just draw a line from those ideas to the denuded site you mentioned before discussing the ramifications of the second commonality more fully.
I would argue the foundational Euro-American idea of nature is that humans are innately entitled to make use of all Earthly phenomena and forces. Almost equally prevalent is the idea that humans’ rational minds enable us to better the world for ourselves by learning its workings and predicting future outcomes without metaphysics. In other words, the common ideological fallback position is that the trees’ fate is determined by their usefulness to humans, and that by structuring our observations we can legitimately adjudicate their value and determine whether they should continue living. Herbert Spencer’s take on natural selection, “survival of the fittest,” affirmed that social needs (like economic growth) are fundamentally existential: without robust social structures the species might collapse. But also, from the positivist mindset, they are calculable. It follows that, in support of a robust society, some nonhumans and environmental phenomena may have to be sacrificed, and such decisions are made defensible by those versed in making specific kinds of structured observations: professionals.
While many design and planning professionals do not personally ascribe to those dictums as stated, I would argue they underpin the protocols defining legitimate professional practice and affirming professional standing. Politicians and property developers, civil engineers and landscape architects, all advertise their pragmatism: their competence to realistically interpret social and environmental phenomena and forces, and to use that intelligence to sensibly manage them for human good as the baseline of performance in their area of expertise. Professional practice is positivist: reasoned solutions to identified problems are products of calculated understandings structured to assure compliance with social norms. Authority to act is conferred by specific modes of reasoning, not moral judgment. Even the emotional intelligence expressed by communities with skin in the game gets translated to a calculable format.
A brief reference to Gifford Pinchot (1865-1946), positivist, utilitarian-leaning first chief of the Bureau of Forestry and later the US Forest Service (USFS), provides some background on the emergence of professionalized expertise as a political tool. It’s also exemplary of how that approach fails to secure its own stated goal: public health, safety, and welfare. Pinchot traveled to Europe to study forest management—as a resource to be preserved in perpetuity, not preservation of ecosystems—because at the time there were no US programs offering such expertise. Upon return to the US, he devoted himself to developing standards for what he defined as conservation in newly reserved federal lands. To rise to that millions-of-acres challenge, he was an early promoter of bringing university-trained specialist-experts (professionals) into government service.
Pinchot’s father endowed The Yale Forest School; and from it, the first wave of forestry supervisors were sent out to scientifically manage the forests of the mountain West. They were charged to achieve “the greatest good of the greatest number in the long run.” By that Pinchot meant that Americans could have their iconic trees and harvest them as timber too. Or, more pertinent to the time, they could graze their cattle in sensitive watersheds. When an uncontrolled forest fire amped-up nationwide existential fears, USFS instituted a zero-tolerance policy for even normative, regularly-occurring small fires. New roads were cut through wilderness areas compromising habitat; and to preserve soil quality, grazing herd-sizes were diminished, reducing the food supplies and livable income of local families. Any moral judgments and emotional reactions were understood to be obviated by the science affirming a “greater good” without parsing the intricacies of “good for who?”
Pinchot’s model of professionalism stands today. Landscape architects and other earth-system management-professionals rely on institutionally structured analyses—including mapping of complex socioenvironmental forces—to validate strategies that arbitrate conflicting values. Good for who? (or what?) is answered by the credentialled expertise of professionals who are assumed to be able to affirm that “good” has been legitimately calculated. And yet, undoubtedly, it would have been better if Pinchot had considered that question more thoughtfully. Federally managed forests have erupted into conflagrations burning-off a century of built-up fuel. While the citizens of Utah and Nevada also sporadically flare-up in armed resistance to federal authority they see as giving more weight to scientific expertise than human lives.
In the present moment, it might seem easy to simply affirm that Pinchot’s understanding of professional expertise was elitist and dismiss his flaws as a foible of the time. They were not. The idea that right made might underpinned Ian McHarg’s quasi-scientific suitability analysis; and as in the case I referred to, it enabled exclusionary social policies. Today, the American Society of Landscape Architecture calls for expert-legitimized multiple use in “Professional Practice – Public Space Design” by stating: “Public practice landscape design strategy combines all aspects of design excellence with fiscal value, legal compliance, and socio-economic factors.” (https://www.asla.org/ContentDetail.aspx?id=62657) Their guidance continues with the reassurance that the “primary goal is to ensure the health, safety and welfare of the general public is fully incorporated in the plans.” That those statements seem so normative is part of their disempowering force: landscape architects charged to operate in service of all needs—an impossibility—are left with no guidance for prioritizing any.
Hard questions are alien to positivist professional discourse: Good for who and what? Healthy for who and what? Safe for who and what? Or how do we define welfare in general terms when wellbeing is specific to subjective minds animating incalculable types of bodies? They cannot be quantifiably answered, so strictly speaking, they are invalid within the accepted framework of understanding. Because of that, a landscape architect’s suggestion that a stand of trees be preserved for ethical reasons—such as a sense of moral obligation to nonhumans—or on the grounds of a community’s emotional attachment, is legitimately rebuttable with a calculation of runoff and the quantified extra costs that would make the project less economically viable.
Multiple use, as an approach to supporting a diverse community, sounds really good. But I would argue that when partnered with the belief that social forces and phenomena can be quantified as if they are physical realities, and with existential fear lurking as the elephant in the room; it’s kind of a scam. To get a better sense of what I am getting at, check out Gil Eyal’s The Crisis of Expertise (2019). In it, he acknowledged the essential function of expertise, such as we want our structures to stay standing and our runoff to not result in floods. But he also called attention to an intrinsic condition of turmoil engendered by its legitimizing structures—professional protocols affirming expertise—that we use to calm fear of uncertainty and minimize risk. He argued that while they seem essential to legitimizing expertise, those structures are in fact performative instruments that do not resolve conflicting understandings. Instead, they alter them by redefining issues and determining the means of negotiating through them.
I will attempt to translate that into the kind of exchange you outlined. Zoning code and environmental assessments ostensibly safeguard human and environmental wellbeing. However, like USFS policies for fire-suppression, they are fundamentally subjective instruments of political force masquerading as objective truths that leverage the power of fear. The tacit acceptance that the professionals involved can, and do, make legitimately sensible interpretations of observed reality, shapes the questions that are deemed reasonable. A complex “landscape” question: “how can we, as an incalculable economically and culturally diverse human community, live reciprocally within also-incalculable Earth phenomena and forces?” is reduced to “how do we build (insert noun here) that will perform to meet (insert socially agreed-upon, generalized as positive outcome here)?”
Shaping the question sets up expectations of what the answer should be; it enables those in authority to eliminate issues that they don’t want to take on. The risk of error and misjudgment is seemingly mitigated, but trust is only viable if essential questions of value are never voiced. In this case, the reductive question situates the skill-set required to answer it within a manageable entity: a singular expert or team of experts professionally credentialled to offer assurance of success in building a project to meet finite but generalized ambitions. Landscape architectural consultants brought into such projects are expected to have drunk that Kool-Aid: they must be willing and able to achieve whatever end the project authority dictates—and that is usually not too-challenging because the project mission is framed with unobjectionable neutrality: more growth, more robust nature, whatever.
Dissent is also limited by the prevailing attitude expressed by the ASLA rubric for public practice that “combines all aspects of design excellence with fiscal value.” That is too easily reduced to: If designs are “excellent”—an absurd generalization—anything goes as long as they arguably offset their costs with fiscal benefits. In other words, it is fine if they promote cultural-gentrification by colonizing a community’s neighborhood with standardized materials and forms consistent with the norms of the dominant social group—which tends to promote real estate gentrification. Likewise, eliminating ecosystem complexity with monocultures is reasonable.
Still, sometimes a landscape architect’s non-neutral, ethically grounded, and emotionally fraught ambition to preserve a stand of existing trees runs up against “best practices”—at which point their desire to “shout until the cows come home” is an almost inevitable response. Eyal refers to the codification of best practices as “mechanical objectivity”: policy or practice is made neutral by grounding it in rules that supersede human judgment. A formulaic solution derived from professional mastery will inevitably take precedence over a complicated discussion about the contingencies of humans’ physical interdependences with the denizens of a stand of trees or even just the enjoyability of being around mature trees.
Writing this, I felt like I was breaking down the quiet parts to say out loud. Many if not most landscape architects have stood on a site or sat in a meeting defending something only to hit a wall of resistance cemented together with professionally-legitimized data of some kind or other. Trees getting the axe based on runoff and cost calculations is par for the course. I am sensitive to the fact that in order to keep working, landscape architecture professionals are pushed into neutral territory to avoid their own personal existential crises. And of course they are not alone there, lots of professionals from other disciplines occupy the same grounds, also wanting “to shout until the cows come home.”
What worries me is that it has become standard practice in landscape architecture to validate a design with some kind of physical evidence—a site analysis—while also clinging to the idea that artistry should offset calculus. The discipline is complicit in using objective rationalizations to direct attention away from more disputable subjective issues and criticism. Although some practitioners rely on specialized technical proficiency—which is like fighting fire with fire.
Unfortunately, credibility is credentialled. Commercial-status, dependent for the most part on compliance with norms, factors heavily into whether or not a landscape architect’s voice will be heard when they want to fight for an ecosystem—human or nonhuman. In the main, the mass of practitioners compete in an office-eat-office arena in which design-value is commodified into project-fees. I believe that is why landscape architecture has lost its voice in discussing socioenvironmental challenges such as climate change. When: “Public practice landscape design strategy combines all aspects of design excellence with fiscal value, legal compliance, and socio-economic factors.”—as Gertrude Stein said about Oakland, “There’s no there, there.”
This may sound like a harsh indictment of landscape architects’ complicity in the system that hushes their voices at the same time it makes them want to “shout until the cows come home.” I can only offer in my defense that any hyperbole is in the service of the students I have taught over two decades who are in that arena, playing that game. With many others, they struggle to back up their assertions with data-driven arguments and visual representations that only hint at their unspoken values, philosophical positions, and deep emotional commitments. And I’m pretty sure that on a daily basis, a lot of them are suppressing impulses to shout. They deserve better.
Looking forward, I would urge landscape architects to not look backward to McHarg’s positivist tradition that anchored design know-how in unquestioned socioenvironmental principles and data-driven assertions. I have heard scattered calls for another vision of practice that unifies scientific understanding with humanities that shape ethical thought and accept that emotional—psychological—awareness is also knowledge. Such approaches deny safe certainties, open hard-to-answer questions, and make overt the conflicts that expertise intentionally buries. And while that creates real challenges, it is good for landscape architects. I have always thought the greatest strength of the discipline is that it encourages polymathic thinking. With more voices in one’s head, one asks more, and more complex, questions that look past simple either-or situations to reveal the motives hidden behind false certainties.
In light of that, my recommendation is to act more ecologically yourself. We live in dynamic, reciprocal relationships with earth phenomena and forces; there is no neutral territory and cooperation is as, or more, common than competition. Your expression of frustration at being thrust into a manmade neutralized zone where not-so-best practices are leveraged in service of dodgy economic imperatives was important. Growth models are absurd, nothing on Earth can grow indefinitely (although some nonhuman species may live indefinitely, which is cool.) In the absence of effective professional guidance, see it as your job to stand up for ecosystems and ecological understandings.
Structures of professionalization divide to conquer. Reject being isolated by standard operating procedure: exchange ideas and attitudes. Get more entangled with the people you work with to talk about your experiences and reveal your ethical concerns. Find or make a community in which you can ask those hard-to-see and impossible to answer questions like “good for who? And admit you don’t know what you don’t know. It will matter. I think too often designers operate subversively by making the expected arguments for a project that they have shaped with other ambitions in mind—I know I did. Publish those projects and explain what you really wanted to do. Provoke conversations that can reanimate the neutralized ambitions of a project and the discipline as a whole. The upshot is: when you can, say the quiet parts out loud.